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Abstract
This paper investigates the combined impact of a first-mover advantage and of firms’ lim-
ited mobility on the equilibrium outcomes of a continuous-time model adapted from by Boyer,
Lasserre, and Moreaux (2007). Two firms face market development uncertainty and may enter
by investing in lumpy capacity units. With perfect mobility, when the first entrant plays as a
Stackelberg leader a Markov perfect preemption equilibrium obtains in which the leader invests
earlier, and the follower later, than in the Cournot benchmark scenario. There is rent equaliza-
tion, and the two firms’ equilibrium value is lower. This result is not robust to the introduction of
firm-specific limited mobility constraints. If one firm is suﬃciently less able than its rival to mo-
bilize resources at early stages of the market development process, there is less rent dissipation,
and no equalization, in a constrained preemption equilibrium. The first-mover advantage on the
product market then results in more value for the less constrained firm, and in less value for the
follower than when they play a` la Cournot with perfect mobility. The leading firm maximizes
value by entering immediately before its constrained rival, though later than made possible by
its superior mobility. Greater uncertainty reduces the value diﬀerential to the benefit of the
follower. It also increases the distance between the firms’ respective investment triggers. The
specifications and results are discussed in light of recent developments in the market for music
downloads.
JEL classification: C73; D43; D92; L13. Keywords: Real options; Preemption; First-mover
advantage; Mobility
∗I am indebted to Karim Aroussi, Marcel Boyer, Vianney Dequiedt, Timothy Folta, Pierre Lasserre, Olivier
Le Courtois, Leonard Mirman, Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne´, and conference audiences
at the 2008 SCSE conference and the 2008 EARIE meeting for comments or help in various forms. Special
thanks are addressed to Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Benoit Chevalier-Roignant, and Richard Ruble, for
very useful discussions and feedbacks on several versions of the paper. All remaining errors are mine.
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“The first mover and only the first mover, the company that acts while others dither,
has a true opportunity to gain time over its competitors — and time advantage, in
this business, is the surest way to gain market share.”
Andrew Grove, Chairman & CEO, Intel Corp.1
1 Introduction
Business circumstances in which rival firms contemplate entry on an emerging or growing
market are prevalent. In most cases, the installation of production and distribution facilities
is needed as a first step, before operations may start. Investments are typically lumpy, and
hardly recoverable. When demand is fluctuating, and changes are uncertain, the timing of
entry impacts the expected value of operations. Early entry is risky, as demand may remain
relatively low for a long time. On the other hand, a firm forgoes operating profits if it
postpones entry to a distant period.
Firms also interact strategically, at two levels. Indeed their long-run investment choices
are not made in isolation. When the sequence of entry is not established a priori, firms will
compete for the lead position if it pays starting operations before others. This occurs if early
entry results in monopoly profits for a while, before demand reaches a suﬃciently high level
that encourages new entrants. Firms also interact strategically in the short-run. As soon as
more than one firm have entered, the formation of prices is the non-cooperative outcome of
interdependent choices. Each firm’s value thus depends on the nature of competition on the
product market.
Only a few contributions to the theoretical literature have used a strategic real options
approach to study investment strategies, when firms are not only confronted with a stochastic
environment, but also with reacting competitors, both in a long-run investment game and
in a short-run market subgame (see Boyer, Gravel, and Lasserre (2009) for a recent and
comprehensive survey). The benchmark case, in what follows, appears in a recent paper by
Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux (2007, BLM hereafter). In a continuous-time model, two rival
firms face market development uncertainty. At each point in time from the very first moment,
they may invest in a discrete number of capacity units, which have no resale value, in order
to supply a homogeneous good. They cannot commit ex ante to a sequence of investments.
1Andrew S. Grove, 1996, Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points that Challenge Every
Company and Career, New York: Currency/Doubleday, p. 51.
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In the early phase of development, if only one firm invests it benefits from a monopolistic
position until the market grows to a threshold level that triggers entry by the other firm. On
the product market, if the first entrant does not benefit from a first-mover advantage, and
both firms hold production capacities, they compete by choosing quantities simultaneously a`
la Cournot. The quantity choices can be capacity constrained.2 When firms have no existing
capacity and contemplate entry, a unique Markov perfect preemption equilibrium always
obtains, in which firms invest at diﬀerent market development thresholds. Each firm may
enter first with the same probability. Competition for the benefit of leading the investment
game, hence to be the only supplier for some period of time, leads to rent equalization and
partial dissipation.
The present paper investigates the impact on equilibrium outcomes of two natural exten-
sions to the benchmark model, separately and in combination. It first focuses on situations
in which, if a firm leads the entry process, it benefits from a first-mover advantage when
the other firm invests also and starts supplying.3 The endogenous sequence of investments,
and ex ante identical firms’ value, are compared with the outcomes of the benchmark case in
which early entry does not induce a favorable position in the market stage. The paper also
examines the consequences of assuming that firms may not be symmetric in their ability to
mobilize the resources they need to enter a new market. This is done by introducing limited
mobility constraints, defined as firm-specific technological specifications. They capture real-
world circumstances in which firms become aware of profitable market opportunities only
when the level of demand is suﬃciently high, or require some non negligible amount of time
to install new productive assets.
Does the first-mover advantage impact the entry sequence of firms? Does it preserve
the rent equalization and dissipation properties? Or can it generate a rent for the leader?
How can adjustment costs, or limited mobility constraints, modify equilibrium outcomes?
What is the consequence of an increase in growth or uncertainty, with limited mobility, and
2The main virtues of the model appear clearly when compared with a reference contribution to the manage-
ment science literature by Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998). In the latter paper, the real option approach is used
with two firms that may also interact strategically both in the investment stage (see the extension in Section
3, pp. 1027-8) and on the product market (Cournot competition). However, in the two-period setup firms may
invest a given amount only once, at the same time 0, before competing in quantities on the market at time
1. Uncertainty is resolved between the two periods. In BLM (2007), firms face a continuously changing and
uncertain demand with an infinite horizon, successive investments are possible, and can constraint quantity
choices. The timing of investment decisions, and their discrete levels, are endogenous.
3For recent real-options models that consider the case of a second-mover advantage, see Hoppe (2000),
Thijssen, Huisman, and Kort (2006), and Mason and Weeds (2008).
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with a first-mover advantage? These questions find only incomplete answers in the empirical
literature that explicitly refers to a real options framework to investigate the impact of first-
mover advantages on entry decisions. In a research note, Folta and Miller (2002) conjecture
that first-mover advantages accelerates entry. Folta and O’Brien (2004) use data from a
broad array of industries to find support to their hypothesis that the choice by a given firm
to enter a new activity is positively related to a measure of early mover advantages. In their
study, entry — the dependent variable — is defined as observed activity by an existing firm in an
industry in which the same firm had not reported involvement in the previous two years. This
cannot fully capture the strategic dimension (in the game theoretic sense) that characterizes
the entry choice by several firms on the same market. In particular, whether two firms enter
almost simultaneously (the same year), or one after another over a large period of time (in two
diﬀerent years), is not considered in the econometric model. Therefore it is not clear whether
a first-mover advantage on the product market, as gained by an early entrant, will impact the
timing of decisions, and firms’ value, in a given industry. In another recent empirical study,
Driver, Temple, and Urga (2008) exploit the observed heterogeneity across forty industries, as
measured in a quarterly survey over two decades. Despite considerable heterogeneity across
industries, they find evidence that indicators of first-mover advantages (specifically, the R&D
and advertising intensity) contribute to a positive relationship of investment to uncertainty.
At a finer level of analysis, however, it remains uneasy to disentangle the impact of industry
wide characteristics from strategic decisions taken by interdependent firms.
In the theoretical analysis that follows, by assuming that a firm, if it enters first, will
behave as a Stackelberg leader should the other firm enter also, and when limited mobility
constraints are absent or weak, one obtains a unique preemption equilibrium again, as in
the original setting with Cournot behavior. However, the leader enters earlier, the follower
enters later, than without a first-mover advantage. This means that, although leadership in
the short-run market subgame expands the range of market development levels for which the
first entrant is the unique supplier, it only delays for a while the other firm’s entry, without
blockading it. The delay monotonically increases, while firms’ value decreases, when the
diﬀerence between the equilibrium profits of the leader and the follower in the market subgame
increases. The leader obtains no rent from the first-mover advantage. The rent equalization
property is preserved, and the two firms’ equal value is lower than in the benchmark setup.
This is because competition for the benefit of being the first supplier is even stronger in the
Stackelberg scenario, leading to more dissipation than in the Cournot scenario. By contrast,
suﬃciently strong limited mobility constraints result in less dissipation and no equalization.
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By dampening competition for the lead position, they transform the first-mover advantage
on the product market, in the Stackelberg scenario, into an additional rent to the leader, and
a loss for the follower, in comparison to firms’ respective values in the Cournot setup, all
other things remaining equal. Greater uncertainty reduces the value diﬀerential. It always
benefits the less mobile firm, in that its constrained equilibrium expected value increases. It
also increases the endogenous distance between the two firms’ investment triggers.
The results are of interest because many business situations illustrate the proposed sce-
nario of cumulative leadership, in which the firm that detects in advance a new market
opportunity, and is able to mobilize resources promptly, preempts the lead position in the ca-
pacity development process, and thereby benefits from a first-mover advantage in the product
market stage. The market for legal music downloads oﬀers a recent example: demand was
inexistent a few years ago, it is growing at an uncertain rate, large firms compete by distrib-
uting goods (songs) available from very similar sources (catalogs of titles), and variable costs
are negligible relative to investment levels (in digital rights, technological diﬀusion capaci-
ties, or advertising campaigns), which are — at least partly — irreversible. In this industry,
Apple first invested in 2001 to install iTunes Music Store, when the market was burgeon-
ing. It was an early move, in that sales remained very limited for almost three years before
accelerating sharply.4 Interestingly, Apple CEO Steve Jobs is frequently portrayed as one
who “has the phenomenal quality of figuring out where the next industry movement would
be” (http://www.iipm.edu, Sept. 23, 2007). This does not apply to the management of Mi-
crosoft, a more recent participant in the market for music downloads. It is well accepted that
“[t]hroughout its history, Microsoft has been slow to grasp some of the computer industry’s
biggest technology shifts and business changes. (. . . ) It also was late coming to market with
its own music player, and despite a push, remains far behind Apple” (http://online.wsj.com,
July 30, 2007). In fact Microsoft waited until late 2006 to launch its own player Zune, and
then MSN Music Store, when demand had reached a much higher level. At that time, the
consensus among observers was that Apple’s sales would not be strongly impacted by the
new entrant. The president of Microsoft’s entertainment division acknowledged that “an-
alysts don’t expect the early eﬀort to make a serious dent in Apple’s market share. (. . . ).
Apple’s obviously still going to be the leader. I think that’s fair. (. . . ) While Microsoft is a
great brand name it’s, you know, not the first word that comes to your mind when someone
4According to the Recording Industry Association of America, in 2001 digital downloads represented only
0.2% of total sales (see: http://www.riaa.com/keystatistics.php). It rose to 0.5% in 2002, and 1.3% in 2003,
then fell to 0.9%, before jumping to 5.7% in 2005. It kept increasing since then.
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says, Hey, music!” (http://www.businessweek.com, Nov. 13, 2006). Another business expert
was even more explicit, as it claimed that Apple “has something that the Zune certainly lacks:
first mover advantage. This advantage is primarily kept where people have bought their music
via the iTunes store. The amount of eﬀort to get your music in a format that is playable on
the Zune (or any other player) is just too much.” (http://www.zdnet.com, Sept. 20, 2006).
The first-mover advantage is likely to be a long lasting phenomenon when it is supported by
a combination of brand loyalty, a technical device or a proprietary format, and use habits, at
the expense of late comers. Microsoft’s market share is only a small portion of Apple’s posi-
tion — that is more than 70% of worldwide online digital music sales in mid 2008 — more than
one year after Zune was introduced. In this example, a new consumer pays for a hardware (a
portable media player) before getting access to an online music store. In addition, a customer
gets used to specific routines (to search the catalog content, to download files, to pay) that
render costly a shift to an alternative supplier. When satisfied with the first supplier, one is
likely to keep consuming from it. This is emblematic of the many circumstances captured by
the new model specification introduced here.
The remain of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the benchmark model is
presented, together with the first-mover advantage specification we introduce, for the analysis
to be self contained. In section 3, the equilibrium outcomes of the Cournot and Stackelberg
scenarios are compared and characterized. In section 4, the impact on equilibrium outcomes
of limited mobility constraints are examined. In section 5, comparative statics results describe
the consequences of a change in growth and volatility. Final remarks appear in section 6.
2 The Model
This section presents briefly BLM’s model in the same notation, augmented by a few addi-
tional specifications that introduce the Stackelberg scenario. For a more detailed description
and intuitive comments please refer to the original paper.
Two risk-neutral symmetric profit-maximizing firms, f and −f , contemplate entry on a
market to sell a non-diﬀerentiated good in quantities xft and x
−f
t , respectively, at each point
in time t. Production requires an investment in a positive integer number of capacity units,
which augment existing capacity stocks kft and k
−f
t , with k
f
0 = k
−f
0 = 0. Each capacity unit
allows a firm to supply up to one output unit. It does not depreciate, and has no resale value.
The fixed cost of acquiring a capacity unit is I in current value.
6
At time t ≥ 0, inverse demand is described by the function
P (t,Xt) = YtD−1(Xt), (1)
where Xt = x
f
t + x
−f
t ≥ 0 is the total output, Yt ≥ 0 is a random shock, and D−1(Xt) ≥ 0 is
a non-stochastic term. Aggregate shocks (Yt)t≥0 follow a geometric Brownian motion
dYt = αYtdt+ σYtdZt, (2)
with Y0 > 0, α > 0 (growth rate), σ > 0 (volatility), and where (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener
process. The time-invariant function D(.) is strictly decreasing, continuously diﬀerentiable,
and integrable on R+, with D(0) = limp↓0D(p) < ∞; the mapping Xt 7−→ XtD−1(Xt) is
strictly concave on (0,D(0)).
Within the interval [t, t+ τ) the timing of the game is as follows: 1) given the realization
of Yt, and existing capital stocks, each firm f chooses to invest a number of capacity units
νft ; 2) Given capacity units, each firm f selects an output level under capacity constraint
xft ≤ k
f
t + ν
f
t ; 3) given output levels, market price is determined according to (1).
The results presented in the next sections compare the Cournot and Stackelberg versions
of the model. In the latter version, the first entrant is also a first-mover in the market
subgame. In the former version of the model, the two firms choose quantities simultaneously.
In both scenarios, market outcomes depend on each firm’s installed capacity, and although
Yt is not bounded for above, an assumption guarantees that investments stop as soon as each
firm holds one capacity unit (or more):
¥ Cournot Firms choose quantities simultaneously. Let kc = dxce be the minimum capital
stock (an integer) required to produce xc, that is the unconstrained equilibrium quantity for
each firm. For a benchmark, as in BLM assume that the market subgame admits a unique
equilibrium (xc, xc), with 0 < xc ≤ 1, so that kc = 1. When firms both operate only one
capacity unit each, they cannot be constrained.
¥ Stackelberg Firms choose quantities sequentially. Let kF = dxF e and kL = dxLe be the
minimum capital stocks required to produce xF and xL, the unconstrained equilibrium quan-
tities of the follower and the leader, respectively. The comparison of this scenario with the
benchmark commands again to assume that the market subgame admits a unique equilibrium
(xF , xL), with 0 < xF ≤ xL ≤ 1, which means that kF = kL = 1. No firm is constrained
when both hold only one capacity unit.
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Given capacities, in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios alike, it follows from (1) that
the equilibrium of the market subgame does not depend on Yt. When a firm holds k capacity
units while its rival holds l capacity units, its instantaneous gross profit is Ytπkl, where πkl,
as computed in the market subgame, depends on installed capacity units only. There is no
commitment by firms relative to the size of their investments, to the quantity they sell, nor to
the sequence of entry, which is endogenous. Only one firm may choose to enter by investing
in capacity units, or both firms may enter simultaneously, or sequentially. As no restriction
on capacity is imposed in the investment game, firms are specified to stop investing when it
is known with certainty that none of them will ever undertake any further investment, as it
would only result in higher fixed costs.5
The specification that firms invest in a production capacity, and not in an abstract project
or entry ticket, oﬀers a very natural mechanism to compare the diﬀerent instantaneous profit
levels firms earn across the two versions of the model, namely π10 (monopoly profits), π11
(Cournot duopoly profits), πF (Stackelberg follower’s profits), and πL (leader’s profits). Sup-
pose that xc < 1, so that investing in one capacity unit is suﬃcient to supply the uncon-
strained Cournot output. Then standard demand specifications, say a linear D(.), lead to the
usual ranking πF < π11 < πL < π10. Still the magnitude of profit diﬀerences depends on the
status of other capacity constraints. In particular, πL is relatively high if xL ≤ 1 (the slack
case), and low otherwise, though strictly above π11, which is constant across the two cases. A
less usual ranking occurs when xc = 1 < xm, so that investing in one capacity unit is exactly
suﬃcient to supply the unconstrained Cournot output, but not the unconstrained monopoly
quantity. It follows that πF = π11 = πL < π10. This obtains whenever best-reply functions
have a negative slope in the quantity plane, hence for a very large class of demand expres-
sions. There is no need to evoke a more sophisticated technological issue, nor a very specific
functional form.6 As for the equality π11 = π10, or πL = π10 with a first-mover advantage,
it is a limit case that can only be approached here (since demand is strictly decreasing), and
will turn a useful reference for the comparison of investment triggers across the two versions
5This is established rigorously in BLM (2007) as Proposition 1: for the investment game to be over, it is
necessary that either 1) no capacity constraint binds in the short-run market subgame, or 2) the two firms’
capacity constraints are binding in the short-run market subgame, and would remain so, should any firm
invest in another unit. The first condition — which is satisfied in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios of the
present model — is also suﬃcient.
6Absent capacity constraints, and without introducing an additional process of imitation, innovation, or
externalities, a very specific condition on the inverse demand function would be needed for the Stackelberg
market substage equilibrium to coincide with the Cournot equilibrium, as shown in Colombo and Labrecciosa
(2008).
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of the game. Note also that kc = kF = kL = 1 makes possible that πv0 > π10, with v > 1, in
which case the first entrant is constrained with only one capacity unit and finds it profitable
to invest more. This situation is left aside in this paper because it does not lead to other
comparisons in instantaneous profit levels than already obtained with v = 1. Hereafter an
investment in exactly one capacity unit simply coincides with the decision to enter.
The equilibrium concept is the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). This means that a
firm’s investment and output decisions at each point in time depend only on the current levels
of capacity units and of the industry-wide shock. It follows that, given installed capacities,
firms may not attempt to coordinate output decisions over time. At each date they play the
unique equilibrium of the market subgame.7 An MPE outcome of the game is an ordered
sequence of investment triggers, with related instantaneous gross profit levels. The latter
are denoted by yij (with yij = yji), where i and j refer to the firms’ capacities immediately
before Yt reaches the level yij for the first time. Note that y11 = ∞ since the game stops
when (i, j) ≥ (1, 1).
In the next section, we first characterize the MPE in the Cournot scenario, when firms
may invest with no delay at any point in time. Some formal developments are presented more
extensively than in BLM, as required for the subsequent characterization of the MPE in the
Stackelberg version. It is demonstrated that the properties of the equilibrium outcomes across
the two versions are rooted in the relative levels of profits a firm may earn as a monopolist,
as a Cournot player, or as a Stackelberg leader/follower in the short-run market subgame.
3 Cournot vs. Stackelberg
In the benchmark case, when both firms hold production capacities, they are assumed to
choose individual quantities simultaneously, a` la Cournot. The analysis investigates all situ-
ations for which
0 < π11 ≤ π10. (3)
This simply says that, when both firms have entered, so that each of them produces the
non-constrained quantity xc ≤ 1, they earn lower individual profits than a monopolist.
7A more formal definition of Markov strategies and payoﬀs under uncertainty is given in Boyer et al. (2004,
Appendix A).
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For notational parsimony, as in the original model define
β =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
"µ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2r
σ2
# 1
2
, (4)
where r is a constant interest rate.8 We have β > 1 for all r > α (the latter inequality must
hold otherwise a firm’s value is maximized by postponing investments for ever).9
When the two firms may invest with no delay at any point in time, from t = 0 onward,
their current value depends on the date at which each of them chooses to enter. Suppose a
firm enters when Yt = y. Then the value of its competitor, if it enters later when Yt reaches
a higher level y0v, is
F (y) =
µ
y
y0v
¶β µ π11
r − αy0v − I
¶
, (5)
all v ≥ 1, where v is the number of units acquired by the opponent before the firm acquires
its first (and single) unit.10 The maximum F ∗(y) with respect to y0v is obtained at
y∗0v = y
∗
01 =
r − α
π11
I
β
β − 1 , (6)
which does not depend on v.11 When a firm invests in one capacity unit immediately, when
Yt = y, while the other one remains out of the market as long as Yt has not hit y∗01, its value
is
L(y) =
π10
r − αy − I +
µ
y
y∗01
¶β π11 − π10
r − α y
∗
01, (7)
for all y < y∗01 (recall from Proposition 1 in BLM, together with 0 < x
c ≤ 1 by assumption,
that the game ends as soon as the other firm enters by investing 1 capacity unit, or more).
8The expression of β is standard. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 140-144) for a detailed exposition of
the steps that lead to it.
9I thank Benoit Chevalier-Roignant for suggesting that, if r is higher than the risk-free rate (e.g., firms
may discount profits at the capital market rate), then the condition r > α authorizes a relatively high level
of α. This makes sense in the case of publicly held firms that contemplate entry on an emerging market. See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 147-150) for diﬀerent interpretations of the discount rate in investment models.
10The expression of value functions, as proposed in BLM, follows Harrison (1985, chapter 3). The term?
y
y0v
?β
reads as the expected discounted value, measured when Yt = y, of receiving 1 monetary unit when Yt
reaches y0v for the first time.
11The expressions of firms’ value are borrowed from BLM’s Lemma 1. Note that F (y) is concave in y0v if
and only if y0v <
?
1 + 1β
?
y∗01. This second-order condition is satisfied at y0v = y∗01 for all β > 1, all v ≥ 1.
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When the same firm does not invest immediately at the current level y, and chooses to
postpone entry until Yt reaches a higher level y00, its value is
Ly00(y) =
µ
y
y00
¶β µ π10
r − αy00 − I
¶
+
µ
y
y∗01
¶β π11 − π10
r − α y
∗
01, (8)
for all y < y00. The maximum of Ly00(y) with respect to y00, hereafter denoted by L
∗(y), is
obtained at
yL00 =
r − α
π10
I
β
β − 1 , (9)
which is strictly lower than (or equal to) y∗01 since π11 < (=)π10.
12 If, at t = 0, a firm
can commit relative to the level of Yt that triggers entry, and thereby be protected from
preemption by its rival, it would enter at yL00. This describes a point of reference that will
be useful in the following, and which corresponds to the stochastic time τL00 = inf{t ≥ 0 :
Yt ≥ yL00}. As yL00 depends on short-run monopoly profits π10, not on π11, it will not be
impacted by the level of profits earned in the short-run duopoly game when both firms have
entered (in the Cournot and Stackelberg versions, indiﬀerently). Observe from (5) and (7)
that F ∗(0) = 0 > L(0) = −I. Moreover, F ∗(y), which is obviously strictly increasing with y
for all relevant parameter values, is also strictly convex, since
d2F ∗(y)
dy2
=
Iβ
y2
µ
y
y∗01
¶β
, (10)
all y > 0, while L(y) is strictly (weakly) concave if and only if π11 < (=)π10, since
d2L(y)
dy2
=
β (β − 1)
y2
µ
y
y∗01
¶β π11 − π10
r − α y
∗
01, (11)
all y > 0. It follows that F ∗(y)−L(y) = 0 may admit up to two roots. Since y∗01 is a root, it
is suﬃcient to observe that
dF ∗(y)
dy
¯¯¯¯
y=y∗01
=
π11
r − α,
and that
dL(y)
dy
¯¯¯¯
y=y∗01
=
π11
r − α − (β − 1)
π10 − π11
r − α ,
to conclude that there exists an other positive root yp00 < y
∗
01 if π11 < π10, and that y
p
00 = y
∗
01
otherwise. This, together with the comparison of F ∗(yL00) with L(y
L
00), and the comparison
of (6) with (9), lead to the following remark.
12Ly00(y) is concave in y00 if and only if y00 <
?
1 + 1β
?
yL00. This second-order condition is satisfied at
y00 = yL00 for all β > 1.
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Remark 1 yp00 < (=)y
L
00 < (=)y
∗
01 if and only if π11 < (=)π10.
In words, when we let the profits π10 of a constrained monopolist, which has invested in
one capacity unit, exactly match the individual profits π11 of unconstrained duopolists, L(y)
is a line which is tangent to the graph of F ∗ at yp00 = y
L
00 = y
∗
01. In the latter limit case only,
the Cournot scenario collapses to the benchmark commitment situation, since the value of
the two firms exactly equates the level of a firm protected from preemption.
To compare, introduce now a modification in the benchmark model by assuming that
firms play sequentially in the market subgame. The first entrant anticipates that the other
firm is going to start supplying later, when Yt reaches a given level, and accordingly adapts
its behavior at that time, a` la Stackelberg. To capture this in the largest possible class of
functional specifications for the non-stochastic component of demand D, let the two firms
earn asymmetric profits when they have both invested in capacity units. When the two
firms are active, the one that entered first earns πL, while the second entrant earns πF , with
πF ≤ πL.13 As in the Cournot version, when only the leader is active, it earns monopoly
profits π10. The counterpart to (3) now is
0 < πF ≤ π11 ≤ πL ≤ π10. (12)
This specification is suﬃciently general to capture a large class of circumstances.14 Then
substitute πF for π11 in (5) to obtain F¯ (y). The maximum F¯ ∗(y) with respect to y0v is
reached at
y¯∗0v = y¯
∗
01 =
r − α
πF
I
β
β − 1, (13)
13In a similar continuous-time investment model, Smit and Trigeorgis (2004, chapter 9) suppress the Stack-
elberg equilibrium. They emphasize that, if quantities are chosen sequentially, the first mover’s choice is not
a best reply to the quantity chosen by the second mover. When the market subgame is repeated, the leader
has an incentive to reduce its output. More generally, here the Stackelberg scenario may refer to a large class
of circumstances in which the first player benefits from any advantage reflected by (12). The many possible
sources of the advantage include brand loyalty eﬀects, switching costs, and other lock-in phenomena. See
Cottrell (2002) for several examples.
14In the present paper, the possibility that the leader earns higher instantaneous profits when the follower
has invested than in monopoly, that is π10 < πL, is ruled out. This case is precisely investigated by Mason and
Weeds (2006, Proposition 5), where unusual comparative statics results characterize situations in which the
follower’s investment benefits the leader so much as to outweigh the eﬀect of increased competition. However
we may have πF = π11 = πL, so that the Stackelberg market substage equilibrium coincides with the Cournot
equilibrium (this occurs if xc = 1 < xm).
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all v ≥ 1. By comparing (13) with (6), one observes that y¯∗01 > (=)y∗01 if and only if
πF < (=)π11. Then substitute y¯∗01 for y
∗
01 and also π
L for π11 in (7) and (8) to obtain L¯(y)
and L¯y00(y), respectively. The maximum of L¯y00(y) with respect to y00 is obtained at the
same value as the maximum of Ly00(y), that is yL00 as displayed in (9). This leads to a first
claim:
Proposition 1 If the first entrant may commit at t = 0 relative to the level of Yt that
triggers entry, it chooses to enter when Yt = yL00, independently of the nature of competition
on the product market in the post-entry period, while π11 < πL implies L¯∗(yL00) > L
∗(yL00) and
F¯ ∗(yL00) < F
∗(yL00).
On the contrary, in the absence of commitment, the nature of competition impacts the
timing of entry decisions. The possibility of playing first in the market subgame makes a
diﬀerence. To see that, compare the slopes of F¯ ∗(y) and L¯(y) with the slopes of F ∗(y) and
L(y), respectively. Define F ≡ F¯ ∗ − F ∗ and L ≡ L¯− L, then recalling that β > 1, to find
dF(y)
dy
=
I
y
β
β − 1
"µ
y
y¯∗01
¶β
−
µ
y
y∗01
¶β#
< 0 (14)
if πF < π11, and
dL(y)
dy
=
β
r − α
"µ
y
y∗01
¶β−1
(π10 − π11)−
µ
y
y¯∗01
¶β−1 ¡
π10 − πL
¢#
> 0 (15)
if π11 < πL, all y > 0. In words, for all positive values of y, in the Stackelberg scenario the
slope of the second entrant’s value function is strictly lower than in the Cournot scenario,
while the slope of the first entrant’s value function is higher than in the Cournot scenario.
Together with F¯ ∗ (0) = F ∗ (0) = 0, and L¯ (0) = L (0) = −I, this leads to conclude that F¯ ∗
and L¯ intersect at a lower value of y, we denote by y¯p00, than F
∗ and L. In addition, it is
suﬃcient to check that F¯ ∗(y¯∗01) < limy↑y¯∗01 L¯(y) when π
F < πL to conclude that F¯ ∗ and L¯
cannot intersect for any y > y¯p00 in the Stackelberg scenario.
Proposition 2 There exists y¯p00 < y
p
00 such that F¯
∗ (y¯p00) = L¯ (y¯
p
00), and F¯
∗ (y) < L¯ (y) for
all y ∈ (y¯p00, y¯∗01).
On the time scale, this means that the two values F¯ ∗ and L¯ equalize earlier in the
Stackelberg scenario than in the Cournot setting, that is τ¯p00 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ y¯p00} < τp00.
It remains to examine when firms choose to be either the first or the second entrant, or to
enter simultaneously. Let Y0 ≤ y¯p00 hereafter, for simplicity. There are three possible cases.
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Suppose first that y < y¯p00, which implies that L¯ (y) < F¯
∗ (y). In that case each firm waits for
the other to enter first, since leadership is less profitable. Suppose now that y ≥ y¯∗01 and that
no firm has entered yet. Then both firms find it profitable to enter immediately. If one of
the two firms leads by entering at y¯∗01 immediately before its rival, its value is
πL
r−αy− I, and
the follower’s value is π
F
r−αy− I. If the two firms enter simultaneously, their value is
π11
r−αy− I
(see the dotted lines in Figure 1). Eventually, when y¯p00 ≤ y < y¯∗01, it is valuable to take the
lead since F¯ ∗ (y) < L¯ (y). Therefore each firm has an incentive to “undercut” its rival on the
segment [y¯p00, y
L
00] to preempt the lead position.
The dynamics of competition for the lead position in the investment stage when firms
play a` la Stackelberg in the short-run market subgame is the same as the one examined
by BLM when firms play a` la Cournot, other things remaining equal. All properties of the
preemption equilibrium, including rent-dissipation and equalization, are robust to the change
in specifications from (3) to (12). The only diﬀerences are that 1) the leader enters earlier,
2) the follower enters later, and 3) each firm’s value is lower in equilibrium.15 The following
claim summarizes the main features of the comparison.
Proposition 3 Suppose πF < (=)π11 < (=)πL: (1) There exists only one MPE outcome
of the investment game, in which firm f (with probability 1/2) invests immediately before Yt
reaches y¯p00 < (=)y
p
00 for the first time, at the stochastic time τ¯
p
00 < (=)τ
p
00, while firm −f
(with probability 1/2) enters at y¯∗01 > (=)y
∗
01, that is waits until the stochastic time τ¯
∗
01 > (=
)τ∗01 to invest; (2) Firms’ equilibrium value is F¯
∗ (y¯p00) = L¯ (y¯
p
00) < (=)F
∗ (yp00) = L (y
p
00).
[Insert Figure 1]
In more intuitive terms, the preemption MPE is characterized by more competition when
the two firms are interested in leading not only the order of entry in the investment stage, but
also the sequence of moves in the short-run market stage. The possibility given by entering
15The proof of the result is simple since it relies exclusively on the comparison of F¯ ∗ and L¯ with F ∗ and L,
respectively. Therefore there is no need to demonstrate again the characterization of a preemption equilibrium
oﬀered in the original setup, including the claim that only one firm invests at yp00 (or y¯
p
00 in the present
paper). In BLM, this result is grounded on a continuous time representation of limits of discrete time mixed
strategy equilibria, adopted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), with firm f ’s strategy defined as a function
sfνf (k
f , k−f , y) ∈ [0, 1] representing the “intensity” with which f invests in νf capacity units, given the
existing stocks (kf , k−f ) and the shock Yt = y. A simpler alternative, as in see Grenadier (1996), is to assume
that, when firms choose the same point in time to enter, an exogenous random mechanism assigns the lead
position to one of them with a given propability.
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first, and then to anticipate the quantity choice of the second entrant to earn πL (in lieu of
π11) in the product market stage, is a bonus for the leader, a penalty for the follower. It
makes the prize sweeter, and the defeat bitter. However, in equilibrium of the investment
game this results in the leader entering earlier, and the follower entering later, that is in
a longer installation period. (Here “installation” is the counterpart to “diﬀusion” in the
terminology introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, 1987) for the analysis of preemption
in technology adoption). No rent results from the extended incumbency period, since the
rent equalization property holds. Therefore no “mobility barrier” (Gilbert (1989)) originates
from the first-mover advantage. Actually there is more dissipation, in the sense that firms’
equal equilibrium values L¯ (y¯p00) and F¯
∗ (y¯p00) are lower than L (y
p
00) and F
∗ (yp00), although
the diﬀerence between L¯ and F¯ ∗ is higher than between L and F ∗ for all values of y. The
first-mover bonus at the market level turns into more competition at the investment level,
and in fine in a lower value for both parties.16
Note that firms may not escape that situation by cooperating, in order to enter later, at
some stochastic date τ > τ¯p00. This would not be a self-enforcing deal (here it is assumed
that an agreement of this kind is not contractible for legal reasons). Supposing it takes
place, the agreement would lead firms to obtain the same value S¯(y) =
³
y
y00
´β ³
π11
r−αy00 − I
´
,
where y00 triggers simultaneous entry for both firms (their instantaneous gross profit is as in
the Cournot scenario because there is no first-mover). A maximum value S¯∗(y) obtains for
y00 = y¯s00. When Yt hits this threshold, each firm’s value is S¯
∗(y¯s00). If a firm, say f , chooses
to deviate while −f sticks to the collusive strategy, it may enter immediately before Yt hits
16The extension of the assumption πF < π11 < πL, and consequently of Proposition 3, to more than two
firms, is not obvious. In a static hierarchical Stackelberg model where n firms choose outputs sequentially,
Anderson and Engers (1992) provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition on a demand parameter and the
number of firms for the first mover to earn lower profits in Stackelberg than in Cournot if n > 2. This is done
with a specific form for the demand function that allows for the linear specification as a particular case, and
marginal costs equal to zero. With the same demand and variable cost specifications, Anderson and Engers
(1994) construct a discrete time sequential investment model, in which n ≥ 2 firms choose the diﬀerent times
at which they enter. This is done by paying a fixed cost and choosing an output level, one after another, before
reaching time 0, that is the opening date of the market where outputs are sold once and for all. (In BLM the
two firms may enter anytime while the market develops, so that simultaneous entry is not excluded a priori,
and firms compete in the market subgame at each point in time afterwards.) When fixed entry costs are not
too high, it is found that all n firms enter and there is equalization of actualized profits, as in the present
Stackelberg scenario (see Proposition 2, p. 839). Further research could thus consist in using the ranking of
profits revealed by Anderson and Engers (1992) in the hierarchical Stackelberg model with more than two
firms to generalize the results obtained here with a duopoly.
15
y¯s00, that is at y¯
s
00 − ε, with ε arbitrarily small, for a value L¯(y¯s00). Accordingly, in the case
of simultaneous entry each colluding firm earns the instantaneous gross profit π11 from τ¯ s00
on, for ever, while in case of deviation f earns π01 from τ¯ s00 − ε to τ¯∗01, and then πL from τ¯∗01
on, again for ever (in the two cases firms pay the entry cost I at — almost — the same time).
Since πL ≥ π11, the collusive entry agreement cannot be implemented for all π01 > π11.17
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3 in the particular case of a linear demand function.
The graphs of L and F ∗ converge to the same point as y approaches y∗01 from below. The
distance between L¯ and F¯ ∗, when y approaches y¯∗01, can be measured by observing that
limy↑y¯∗01 L¯(y) − F¯
∗(y¯∗01) = I
β
β−1
πL−πF
πF , which is proportional to the diﬀerence between the
profits earned by the leader and the follower in the short-run market subgame.18 One also
obtains a longer time period during which the first entrant is the unique supplier. Although it
does not lead to a blockaded entry, playing first in the short-run market subgame postpones
the other firm’s investment for a while. This comes at some cost, since the leader enters
earlier, hence at more risk, and the two firms’ values are lower, than in the benchmark
situation.19
The comparison of MPE outcomes across the two versions can be made more precise.
First, it depends on the diﬀerence between πF and πL. One way to formalize this is to define
the non-negative diﬀerences γ and δ, with πF = π11−γ and πL = π11+δ, before substituting
π11 − γ for πF and π11 + δ for πL in (14) and (15). Then one obtains d
2F(y)
dγdy = −
d2L(y)
dδdy =
− βr−α
³
y
y¯∗01
´β−1
< 0, while d
2L(y)
dγdy = β
M−L
F
³
y
y¯∗01
´β−1 β−1
r−α > 0. In words, given π11, when γ
increases the graph of F¯ ∗ becomes flatter, while the graph of L¯ becomes steeper (also when
δ increases). Therefore:
Remark 2 y¯p00 and F¯
∗ (y¯p00) = L¯ (y¯
p
00) are monotone decreasing when profit diﬀerences γ
and/or δ increase.
17Of course this holds also in the Cournot alternative, and also if y¯s00 > y¯∗01, in which case πL ≥ π11 is
suﬃcient to conclude.
18Beyond y¯∗01, each firm’s value is a linear function of y. This is because, for y ≥ y¯∗01, and if no entry
occurred, both firms will enter immediately. With probability 1/2, firm f enters first and its value is π
L
r−αy−I;
firm −f follows and its value is πFr−αy − I (see Figure 1).
19In real-world circumstances, a first-mover advantage is likely to erode over time. It will not be sustainable
for ever. Brand loyalty, or consumption habits, are certainly not immutable, so that the diﬀerence between
profit levels πF , π11, and πL is likely to shrink progressively (see Cottrell and Sick (2005) for historical
evidence). Therefore firms’ equilibrium values, as derived in the present setting, should be seen as benchmarks
vis-a`-vis more realistic situations in which the first investor’s superiority is only temporary.
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Moreover, (9) and (13) imply that the diﬀerence between yL00 and y¯
∗
01 depends on π
F and
π10, but not on πL, while (14) and (15) imply that y¯
p
00 = y
p
00 and y
∗
01 = y¯
∗
01 if and only if π
F
and πL are equal also (i.e., in the Cournot setting). More precisely:
Remark 3 y¯p00 = y
p
00 = y
L
00 = y
∗
01 = y¯
∗
01 if and only if π
F = π11 = πL = π10.
There are only two particular situations in which we do not obtain either only equality
signs (as in the latter remark) or only strict inequality signs throughout the comparison of
all threshold values of y: (i) if πF = π11 = πL < π10, we have y¯
p
00 = y
p
00 < y
L
00 < y
∗
01 = y¯
∗
01,
which simply means that the Stackelberg situation “degenerates” to the Cournot case; (ii) if
πF < π11 = πL = π10, we have y¯
p
00 < y
p
00 = y
L
00 = y
∗
01 < y¯
∗
01, which compares a particular
Stackelberg outcome with the benchmark situation in which the leader may commit to enter
when Yt reaches yL00 (the leader’s profits can be made equal to both monopoly profits and one-
shot duopoly profits by relaxing the strict monotonicity assumption of the demand function).
We may thus connect the ranking of investment triggers, across the two versions of the game,
to all possible rankings of instantaneous profit levels a firm may earn in the short-run market
subgame.
4 The Case of Limited Mobility
From Proposition 3, we know that in equilibrium each firm may lead the investment schedule,
or follow, with probability 1/2, in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios alike. The indeter-
minacy of the identity of the leader/follower is a consequence of the assumption that firms
are a priori symmetric. To avoid relying on a random selection mechanism that distributes
roles without any economic rationale, one may introduce an investment cost asymmetry as in
Pawlina and Kort (2001), a marginal cost asymmetry, or a quality diﬀerential, as suggested
by Smit and Trigeorgis (2004). The firm with a lower fixed or marginal cost, or with a higher
demand, would be the one that preempts its less profitable competitor.
An alternative approach, adopted here, is to relax the assumption that firms are equally
able to mobilize resources they need with no delay at any point in time, from t = 0 onward.
Clearly this perfect mobility specification does not fit many real-world circumstances. The
fact that a new demand takes oﬀ is certainly not obvious at early stages. Once detected,
the installation of production and distribution resources of all kinds, as required to start
supplying, cannot be immediate. As Prescott and Visscher (1977, p. 379) put it, “some
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entrants become aware of a profitable market before others or require longer periods of time
in which to ”tool up”.” To illustrate, consider again the market for legal music downloads
mentioned in introduction. In a press conference concerning the first anniversary of the
iTunes Music Store, Steve Jobs emphasized the fact that Apple was prompter than rivals to
assess the sales potential of that market when it was only embryonic: “Zero to 70 million
in one year, you know, if a year ago anyone had predicted that iTunes would sell 70 million
songs during its first year, they would have been laughed out of town.” Following Apple’s early
entry, after a couple of years the firm’s market value rose significantly more than the ones of
subsequent entrants.20 Can this fact be considered as prima facie evidence that rents may
originate from the superior ability to assess the potential of an emerging market?
To answer this question, a simple — and most realistic — departure from the frictionless
world described so far consists in assuming that, at least in the early development stages
of a new market, firms may not be equally able to explore emerging opportunities, or to
set up the assets they need to exploit them. In other words, firms may be imperfectly and
asymmetrically able either to identify the potential of a burgeoning market, or to move fast
and invest as soon as they find it profitable to do so. The simplest possible way to capture
this idea is to introduce mobility constraints Yt ≥ yf and Yt ≥ y−f for the two firms f and
−f , respectively, with 0 ≤ yf ≤ y−f .21 The constraints formalize the assumption that the
management is unable to seize market opportunities, or to initiate an investment process, if
the market has not grown up to a certain level, which can be firm-specific. The levels yf and
y−f cannot be adjusted by firms in the short-run; they are technological (or organizational)
parameters.22 I assume they are known by all parties, and are unchanged across the Cournot
and Stackelberg versions of the model. Since the analysis focuses on an infant industry,
and the level yL00 is not only lower than y
∗
01 and y¯
∗
01, but also a reference point common to
20See the transcript of the press conference from Steve Jobs concerning the first anniversary of the iTunes
Music Store, dated April 29th, 2004, available at: http://www.macobserver.com.
21Mobility thresholds can be given a chronological interpretation by defining the corresponding stochastic
dates τf and τ−f . Since the time to “tool up” is measured from date t = 0, that is from the opening date
of the market onwards, τf and τ−f can be understood as durations. The more mobile firm f is able to enter
immediately after date τf . Firm −f is slower, as it takes more time τ−f to satisfy the technological conditions
that allow it to enter. If yf = 0, then τf = 0 ≤ τ−f (i.e., the more mobile firm is perfectly mobile as it is able
to invest immediately at all market development levels).
22The mobility constraints clearly diﬀer from the decision lags in Gilbert and Harris (1984, Section 3) where
a firm is assumed to be able to invest strictly before its rival. Hence the first investment can occur at any
t, from the very beginning. The decisions lags, although arbitrarily close to zero, are always positive. To
compare, in the present model firms can be mobile only for t > τL00. Moreover we may have τf = τ−f .
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the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios (see Proposition 1), it is convenient to specify that
y−f ≤ yL00, implying that τf ≤ τ−f ≤ τL00 (i.e., both firms are suﬃciently mobile to enter as
soon as Yt hits yL00).
23
How are entry decisions, and firm values, impacted by the limited mobility constraints?
If the current industry-wide shock is strictly less that yf , obviously no entry may occur,
for all yf , y−f . Otherwise the exact timing of entry depends on the comparison of mobility
parameters with yp00 in the original setup (or y¯
p
00 with a first-mover advantage). When both
firms are almost perfectly mobile, in the sense that y−f ≤ yp00 (or y−f ≤ y¯
p
00), we already
know that a free MPE outcome obtains in which only one firm enters at yp00 (resp. y¯
p
00) while
the other firm waits until τ∗01 (resp. τ¯
∗
01).
24 Any firm can be either the leader or the follower
in the investment subgame, with equiprobability. In that case, the specification that mobility
parameters yf and y−f may diﬀer across firms plays no role.
Of more interest are all situations in which at least one constraint bites. When lim-
ited mobility constraints are symmetric, and suﬃciently strong so that no free preemption
equilibrium obtains, the “floor” yf = y−f prevents rent competition to fully dissipate and
equalize monopoly rents. In the constrained preemption equilibrium, one of the two firms,
say f , enters immediately before Yt reaches the constraint, and −f again enters at y∗01 (or
at y¯∗01). The limited mobility constraints may also diﬀer across firms. If y
f < y−f firm f is
given the possibility not to invest immediately when Yt hits yf . When Yt < y−f , firm f faces
no threat of entry by the rival −f , and thus may choose not to invest until Yt reaches any
higher level y00 in the interval [yf , y−f ]. In the time dimension, it may postpone entry to
any point τ00 in [τf , τ−f ], during which it is protected from preemption. When positive, the
diﬀerence between mobility parameters makes it impossible for firm −f to contest the lead
position for a while. Firm f may thus exploit the lack of market awareness or of technological
agility of its rival to postpone entry, and nevertheless to enter first, at less risk, and at some
profit. Since opting for leadership in the entry process is a dominant strategy, and the value
function is monotone increasing with y, firm f ’s optimal choice is to enter at y−f − ε, with
ε arbitrarily small (henceforth consider ε is negligible to simplify the notation).25 In other
words, the more mobile firm finds it optimal to postpone entry as much as possible, to enter
an instant before the rival is able to contest the lead position. To summarize:
23With no upper bound on mobility parameters, immobile firms would be defined for τf = τ−f =∞.
24Here y¯p00 ≤ y
p
00 implies that, in the Cournot scenario, if y
−f ≤ y¯p00 the leader enters at y
p
00, not at y¯
p
00, in
a free premption equilibrium.
25The reasoning is similar to the choice of price in a Bertrand duopoly, with asymmetric marginal costs,
when the low cost supplier maximizes profits by charging a price almost equal to the rival’s marginal cost.
19
Proposition 4 Suppose yp00 ≤ yf (or y¯
p
00 ≤ yf ) so that the MPE is constrained: (1) If
constraints are symmetric, firm f (with probability 1/2) invests immediately before Yt reaches
yf = y−f for the first time, and firm −f (with probability 1/2) enters at y∗01 (resp. at y¯∗01);
(2) If constraints are asymmetric, firm f (with probability 1) invests immediately before Yt
reaches y−f > yf for the first time, and firm −f enters at y∗01 (resp. at y¯∗01).
[Insert Figure 2]
Obviously, when the constraint Yt ≥ y−f is suﬃciently stringent, the identity of the first
entrant is no more indeterminate. Leadership is more cumulative than in the case of perfect
mobility. The firm that is aware in advance of the market potential, or requires a shorter
period of time to trigger the investment procedure, is also the one that leads the entry process.
However, for a given y−f the leading firm does not necessarily enter at the same point in time
in the Cournot and Stackelberg contexts. Therefore the exact comparison of firm values, in
equilibrium, across the two scenarios of product market competition, depends on the level of
mobility parameters. To see that, first define yˆ in [y¯p00, y
p
00] such that L (y
p
00) < (=)L¯ (y) if
and only if y > (=)yˆ, and also yˇ in [yp00, y¯
∗
01] such that F
∗ (yp00) < (=)F¯
∗ (y) if and only if
y > (=)yˇ.26 Then refer to Figure 2, which represents all the properties of the value functions
we need, together with the comparison of equilibria across the Cournot and Stackelberg
scenarios, to visualize the rankings of firm values for all levels of y−f , as made formal in the
following claim.
Proposition 5 Suppose πF < π11 < πL: if y−f ≤ yp00 in the Cournot setup, or if y−f ≤ y¯
p
00
in the Stackelberg scenario, limited mobility has no impact on the free MPE of the investment
game. Otherwise:
(i) if y¯p00 < y
−f ≤ yˆ
F¯ ∗(y¯p00) = L¯(y¯
p
00) < F¯
∗(y−f ) < L¯(y−f ) < F ∗(yp00) = L(y
p
00); (16)
(ii) if yˆ < y−f ≤ yp00
F¯ ∗ (y¯p00) = L¯(y¯
p
00) < F¯
∗(y−f ) < F ∗(yp00) = L(y
p
00) < L¯(y
−f ); (17)
26The existence of yˆ and yˇ follows from the continuity of value functions, together with L¯ (y¯p00) < L (y
p
00) <
L¯ (yp00) for the first threshold, and F¯
∗ (yp00) < F
∗ (yp00) < F¯
∗ (y¯∗01) for the second one. The monotonicity of
value functions guarantees uniqueness.
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(iii) if yp00 < y
−f ≤ yˇ
F¯ ∗(y¯p00) = L¯(y¯
p
00) < F¯
∗(y−f ) < F ∗(yp00) = L(y
p
00) < F
∗(y−f ) < L(y−f ) < L¯(y−f );
(18)
(iv) if yˇ < y−f ≤ yL00
F¯ ∗(y¯p00) = L¯(y¯
p
00) < F
∗(yp00) = L(y
p
00) < F¯
∗(y−f ) < F ∗(y−f ) < L(y−f ) < L¯(y−f ).
(19)
In less formal terms, in cases (i) and (ii), that is when firms are still relatively mobile
(i.e., y−f ≤ yp00), firm f enters at y
p
00 in the Cournot case, and −f at y∗01 as in the absence of
constraints.27 However, in the Stackelberg scenario, the more mobile firm f finds it profitable
to enter at y−f , whereas −f enters at y¯∗01, and both entities benefit from it. More precisely, in
case (i) there is rent equalization and dissipation in the Cournot scenario, as in the benchmark
model. However, f ’s value is higher than −f ’s value in the Stackelberg scenario. In the
latter case the two firms’ respective values, although higher than with no limited mobility
constraints, remain lower than in Cournot. In that sense, the first-mover advantage in the
product market stage does not pay. In (ii), the follower’s value in the Stackelberg scenario is
higher than with perfect mobility, although it remains lower than any of the two firms’ values
with Cournot. An important outcome is that the Stackelberg leader’s value is highest. That
is, cumulative leadership is profitable for the leader.
The latter claim holds in the other two cases, where firms are less mobile (i.e., yp00 < y
−f ).
In (iii) and (iv) the more mobile firm, f , enters at y−f (i.e., immediately before the shock
reaches that level), which is higher than yp00, in the Cournot and Stackelberg cases alike (−f
enters at y∗01 and at y¯
∗
01, respectively). An important result is that the leader benefits from
the first-mover advantage (i.e., L¯
¡
y−f
¢
> L
¡
y−f
¢
, for all y−f in (y¯p00, y
L
00]), while the follower
is worse oﬀ (i.e., F¯ ∗
¡
y−f
¢
< F ∗
¡
y−f
¢
). By reducing competition for the lead position in the
investment game, asymmetric limited mobility constraints turn the first-mover advantage —
a property that characterizes the short-run market subgame — into more value for firm f at
equilibrium in the long-run investment game, at some cost for the rival −f . Formally,
d2L¯(y−f )
dδdy−f
= −d
2F¯ ∗(y−f )
dγdy−f
=
µ
y−f
y¯∗01
¶β−1 β
r − α > 0.
27The values F ∗(y−f ) and L(y−f ) do not appear in (16-17) because in the Cournot scenario no firm will
enter at y−f < yp00.
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The larger the distance δ between Cournot instantaneous profits π11 and the leader’s profits
πL, the higher the marginal value, for f , as a function of firm −f ’s mobility parameter y−f .
Note that in (iii) the two Cournot players’ equilibrium value in a free preemption equilib-
rium (that is F ∗(yp00) = L(y
p
00)) is lower than their respective values in a constrained MPE.
This means that, when no first-mover advantage characterizes the product market, and −f ’s
limited mobility constraint bites, there is less rent dissipation than when y−f is lower than
yp00. Moreover firm values are not equal as f benefits more than −f from the delayed entry
process (F ∗
¡
y−f
¢
< L
¡
y−f
¢
). The only diﬀerence in (iv) is that the follower’s value, in the
Stackelberg scenario, is now larger than the benchmark, that is Cournot firms’ equal equi-
librium value with perfect mobility.28 This is because the leader enters late, at a relatively
high y−f , above yˇ. This compensates for the reduction in the instantaneous profits firm −f
earns, on the product market, as a second mover.
5 Growth and Volatility: Comparative Statics
This section discusses the eﬀect of a change in the parameters that appear in the geometric
Brownian motion, namely α (growth) and σ (volatility), on the level of Yt at which entry
takes place, and on the associated value of firms, in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios,
with or without mobility limitations.
Define the diﬀerence D(y) ≡ L¯(y)−F¯ ∗(y), for any y in the interval (0, yL00], which includes
yp00 and y¯
p
00. In what follows, for conciseness I use the latter Stackelberg notation only, since
it encompasses formally the Cournot case (it suﬃces to specify γ = δ = 0). Recall that y¯p00
is implicitly defined by D(y¯p00) = 0, and that D(y−f ) > 0 for all y−f in (y¯p00, yL00].
¥ Growth For all y ≤ yL00, if 0 < πF ≤ πL ≤ π10, one finds
dD(y)
dα
=
∂D(y)
∂β| {z }
>0
dβ
dα|{z}
<0
+
∂D(y)
∂α| {z }
≥0
, (20)
hence the eﬀect of the growth parameter α on y¯p00, and on firms’ value, for all y
f , y−f , is
ambiguous.29 A higher drift may either decrease or increase the diﬀerence between L¯(y) and
28For some parameter values we may have yˇ ≥ yL00, implying that (iv) is irrelevant.
29All derivations appear in the appendix.
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F¯ ∗(y), at any level of y ≤ yL00, implying in particular that y¯
p
00 either increases or decreases,
respectively.
Example 1 Let α = 12
¡
r − σ2
¢
, implying that β = 2. Then pick r = 3/4, σ = 1/2, together
with πF = 1/4, πL = 1/2, and solve D(y) = 0. This leads to y¯p00, which can be written as a
function of π10 and I. Then dD(y)/dα, when evaluated at y¯p00, reduces to a simple expression
which is positive (zero) if and only if π10 is less than (equal to) 7/4.
It follows that the impact of a change in α on firms’ (constrained) preemption equilibrium
value can also be either negative or positive, depending on parameter values.
¥ Volatility For all y ≤ yL00, we have
dD(y)
dσ
=
∂D(y)
∂β| {z }
>0
dβ
dσ|{z}
<0
, (21)
which is therefore negative. The eﬀect of σ on the diﬀerence D is thus univocal. Since (21)
holds on the interval (0, yL00], the impact of a change in σ on the level of Yt at which entry
takes place can be inferred from the negative sign of dD(y)/dσ, as follows:
(1) In a free preemption MPE, when σ increases, the leader enters later, at a higher level
y¯p00 (a consequence of L¯(y) R F¯ ∗(y) if and only if y R y¯
p
00).
30 The follower enters latter
also, at a higher level y¯∗01 (this is because dy¯
∗
01/dσ = (∂y¯
∗
01/∂β) (dβ/dσ) > 0).
31 Here
the sign of the change of the diﬀerence between y¯p00 and y¯
∗
01, and in the two firms’ equal
value F¯ ∗(y¯p00) = L¯(y¯
p
00), at this level of generality, is indeterminate.
(2) In a constrained preemption MPE, when σ increases, the leader’s entry date remains
the same (y−f does not depend on σ), and again the follower enters later, so that the
“installation” gap between the two investment triggers increases also. Since a higher σ
results in a narrower distance D(y−f ), the value diﬀerential between the leader and the
30An increase in σ will not change the level of y at which the leader enters until y¯p00 (which does depend
on σ) reaches y−f from below, in which case one gets back to a free preemption equilibrium. The conclusion
that a higher σ delays investments is intuitive and standard. To compare, Mason and Weeds (2008) find that
greater uncertainty can lower the leader’s trigger point when the follower’s investment benefits the leader, so
that π10 < πL is possible, a case we do not consider here.
31It is easy to check that ∂y¯∗01/∂β < 0, while dβ/dσ < 0 is proved in the appendix.
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follower decreases. This occurs always at some benefit for firm −f , since one checks
that
dF¯ ∗(y)
dσ
=
∂F¯ ∗(y)
∂β| {z }
<(=)0
dβ
dσ|{z}
<0
> (=)0, all y < (=)yL00. (22)
Moreover, without adding more structure to the model, π01 > πL implies
dL¯(y)
dσ
=
∂L¯(y)
∂β| {z }
>(=)0
dβ
dσ|{z}
<0
< (=)0 iﬀ y < (=)y¯∗01 exp(−1/β). (23)
When the derivative is negative (positive), more volatility penalizes (benefits) the lead-
ing firm f . Since y¯∗01 exp(−1/β) < yL00 if and only if πF /π01 > exp(−1/β), firm f ’s
value will increase with σ only when the profit ratio πF/π01 is suﬃciently high for the
entry threshold y−f to be possibly in the interval (y¯∗01 exp(−1/β), yL00], in which case
more volatility benefits firm f also.
Example 2 Let α = 12
¡
r − σ2
¢
, implying that β = 2. Then pick r = 3/4, σ = 1/2, together
with πF = 1/2, π01 = 3/4, and I = 1/2. With these values πF/π01 > exp(−1/β), so
that dL¯(y−f )/dσ is negative (zero) if y−f < (=)y¯∗01 exp(−1/β), and positive otherwise. In
particular dL¯(y−f )/dσ
¯¯
y−f=y¯p00
< 0, while dL¯(y−f )/dσ
¯¯
y−f=yL00
> 0.
To summarize:
Proposition 6 In a mobility constrained preemption equilibrium, the eﬀect of the growth
parameter is ambiguous, while more uncertainty reduces the positive rent diﬀerential D(y−f ),
down to zero when y¯p00 reaches y
−f from below, at the advantage of the follower, −f . It
also increases the gap between the two investment triggers y−f (a parameter) and y¯∗01 (which
increases with σ).
6 Final Remarks
If firms are perfectly mobile, by assuming that, when the other firm enters, the leading
investor benefits from a first-mover advantage in the duopoly market subgame (to capture,
say, a brand loyalty, or consumption habits), a preemption equilibrium obtains in which
the leader invests earlier, and the follower later, than in the benchmark scenario. However,
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the longer incumbency period does not result in additional rents to the leader. The two
firms’ equilibrium values are equal. They are also lower than in the absence of first-mover
advantage. The rent-equalization outcome is preserved, with more dissipation. More profits
for one player at each point in time results in less expected value for both in a dynamic setup.
This result thus reinforces the usual conclusion that, by competing for the lead position on
a growing market with development uncertainty, firms actually take in value. It also clearly
rationalizes the case of real-world firms that enter very early on a new market, seeking the
benefit of a pioneering move, and nevertheless demonstrate no superior financial performance
in the long run.
However, another conclusion of the paper is that the latter result is rooted in the crucial
— albeit usually implicit in the literature — assumption that firms may enter at any point in
time, with no delay, at the early stages of a new market development process. This perfect
mobility assumption does not reflect all observed real-world circumstances. Indeed a very
diﬀerent picture is obtained once firm-specific limited mobility constraints are introduced.
They capture situations in which investors are not equally able to explore new market oppor-
tunities, or to install promptly the assets they need to exploit them. The constraints serve
resolving the indeterminacy of the identity of the leader/follower in a preemption equilibrium,
in a similar way as a cost asymmetry or a quality diﬀerential. They also lead to unfamiliar
outcomes.
In the absence of first-mover advantage, the dampening-of-competition eﬀect of mobility
constraints results in higher and asymmetric firm values. The first investor, in equilibrium,
is the firm that may detect in advance the potential of a growing market, and/or is capable
to trigger the entry process at a lower level of demand. It invests immediately before the less
mobile rival may enter. With a first-mover advantage in the short-run market stage, what was
a Pyrrhic victory for the leader in the case of perfect mobility turns into a profitable success
story when mobility is imperfect. The market advantage amplifies the impact of mobility
constraints on firms’ performance. The leader’s value is higher, while the follower’s one is
lower, than in the benchmark Cournot case, other things (including mobility constraints)
remaining equal. While a change in growth has an ambiguous eﬀect, more volatility is shown
to reduce the positive diﬀerence in firms’ value, to the benefit of the follower, and to increase
the distance between the two firms’ respective investment triggers.
Arguably, these findings contradict common wisdom, which sees only virtue in the ability
to move fast. In the model, the leading firm finds it most profitable to enter immediately
before its rival, though possibly much later than with perfect mobility. The point is certainly
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not to enter early, but only earlier than a competitor. In this framework, a long duration
between the entry dates of two firms, as observed on a growing market, is no indication of
a proportionally large gap in the managers’ ability to seize new opportunities. To illustrate,
on the market for legal music downloads, where Apple clearly benefits from a first-mover
advantage, there is no reason to interpret the late introduction of Zune by Microsoft as an
evidence of extreme bureaucratic inertia. It is consistent with a value maximizing behavior,
with only a limited diﬀerence in the two firms’ swiftness or their managers’ “vista”, and with
a highly uncertain demand. This also resulted in a large value diﬀerential, as predicted by
the model with a first-mover advantage and limited mobility.
The source of rent this analysis points to is actually a technological or managerial limi-
tation of at least one firm’s ability to detect a burgeoning demand, or to mobilize resources.
When firms compete for the lead position, the limitation is a necessary condition for an
entrepreneurial competitor to benefit from the advantage it seeks by entering first. This
theoretical output can be tested empirically, as one may check whether limited mobility con-
straints play a role in real-world circumstances. On a given emerging market, if the value
of an early investor — which can be approximated by the capital market value — can be ob-
served to benefit from a first-mover advantage, one may conclude that the industry was not
prompt at mobilizing the resources needed to enter, to the advantage of the first investor.
If early entry does not result in intra-industry profit diﬀerentials, it reveals that unleashed
rent-seeking behavior has taken place. There is no reason to conjecture, on purely analytical
grounds, that the latter case is more frequent than the former.
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Appendix
A1. Derivative of D w.r. to α
For all y ≤ yL00, we show that
dD(y)
dα
=
∂D(y)
∂β| {z }
>0
dβ
dα|{z}
<0
+
∂D(y)
∂α| {z }
≥0
. (24)
Consider the three terms in turn. First,
∂D(y)
∂β
= − I
(β − 1)πF
µ
ln
µ
y
y¯∗01
¶¡
πF +
¡
π01 − πL
¢
β
¢
+ π01 − πL
¶µ
y
y¯∗01
¶β
,
which is positive (zero) if and only if y < (=)y¯∗01/y˜, where y˜ ≡ exp
³
π01−πL
πF+β(π01−πL)
´
. Next yL00 can be
shown to be strictly lower than y¯∗01/y˜ for all parameter values. Indeed, recalling that y¯
∗
01 ≡ r−απF I
β
β−1
and yL00 ≡ r−απ01 I
β
β−1 , one obtains y
L
00 < y¯
∗
01/y˜ if and only if π01 > π
F y˜. Then observe that
∂
¡
π01 − πF y˜
¢
∂πF
= − exp
µ
π01 − πL
πF + (π01 − πL)β
¶ ¡
πF
¢2
+ πF (2β − 1)
¡
π01 − πL
¢
+ β2
¡
π01 − πL
¢2
(πF + β (π01 − πL))2
,
which is negative for all π01 ≥ πL ≥ πF > 0 and β > 1. The latter monotonicity implies that
π01 − πF y˜ ≥ π01 − πL exp
¡¡
π01 − πL
¢
/
¡
πL + β
¡
π01 − πL
¢¢¢
.
As the expression on the right side of the inequality sign is monotone increasing with β, it is suﬃcient
to impose β = 1 to find π01 − πF y˜ > π01 − πL exp
³
π01−πL
π01
´
, which is zero if π01 = πL, and positive
otherwise. It follows that π01 > πF y˜, therefore yL00 < y¯
∗
01/y˜, and ∂D(y)/∂β > 0 for all y ≤ yL00.
Second, for all β > 1 one finds
dβ
dα
=
−β¡
β −
¡
1
2 −
α
σ2
¢¢
σ2
< 0. (25)
Third,
∂D(y)
∂α
=
(β − 1)π01πF y − I
³
y
y¯∗01
´β
β (r − α)
¡
πF + β
¡
π01 − πL
¢¢
(β − 1) (r − α)2 πF
.
Then observe that
∂2
∂y2
µ
∂D(y)
∂α
¶
= −Iβ2
πF +
¡
π01 − πL
¢
β
πF (r − α) y2
µ
y
y¯∗01
¶β
< 0,
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therefore ∂D(y)/∂α is concave in y, with two roots, namely
y0 = 0 and y00 = yL00
Ãµ
π01
πF + (π01 − πL)β
¶ β
β−1 πF +
¡
π01 − πL
¢
β
πF
!
> 0,
for all π01 ≥ πL ≥ πF > 0. It can now be shown that the latter root cannot be strictly lower than yL00.
We have y00 = yL00 if and only if β = 0, which is not admissible, or πL = π01 +
πF
β
³
1−
¡π01
πF
¢β´
. The
latter solution is not admissible either. To see this, observe first that y00 is monotone increasing with
πL. Then recall that πF ≤ πL ≤ π01, and remark that
∂
³
π01 + π
F
β
³
1−
¡π01
πF
¢β´´
∂πF
=
1
β
+
³π01
πF
´β µ
1− 1
β
¶
> 0,
and
∂
³
π01 + π
F
β
³
1−
¡π01
πF
¢β´´
∂π01
= 1−
³π01
πF
´β−1
< (=)0,
if πF < (=)π01, so that π01 + π
F
β
³
1−
¡π01
πF
¢β´
reaches a maximum only if πF is the highest possible
given π01, and π01 is the lowest possible given πF , that is for πF = πL = π01. In that case π01 +
πF
β
³
1−
¡π01
πF
¢β´
= πL, so that whenever πF < πL ≤ π01 or πF ≤ πL < π01 we obtain that πL must
be strictly higher than π01 + π
F
β
³
1−
¡π01
πF
¢β´
, implying that y00 > yL00, all β > 1. It follows that
the partial derivative of D(y) w.r. to α does not change sign on (0, yL00]. Then pick, say, πF = 1/3,
πL = 1/2, π01 = 1 to conclude. ¤
A2. Derivative of D w.r. to σ
For all y ≤ yL00, we show that
dD(y)
dσ
=
∂D(y)
∂β| {z }
>0
dβ
dσ|{z}
<0
< 0. (26)
It has been established above that ∂D(y)/∂β > 0 for all y ≤ yL00. Next, we have
dβ
dσ
= −2 2σ
2 (r − αβ)
2
¡
β −
¡
1
2 −
α
σ2
¢¢
σ5
.
From the expression of β in (4) we know the denominator is positive. The only root of the numerator
is β = r/α. Again from (4) the latter equality holds if and only if r = α or r = 0 (which is not
admissible), otherwise β < r/α. This leads to a negative sign. ¤
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A3. Derivative of F¯ ∗ and L¯ w.r. to σ
For all y < (=)yL00, we show that
dF¯ ∗(y)
dσ
=
∂F¯ ∗(y)
∂β| {z }
<(=)0
dβ
dσ|{z}
<0
> (=)0. (27)
This is because
∂F¯ ∗(y)
∂β
=
I
β − 1
µ
y
y¯∗01
¶β
ln
y
yL00
,
which is negative (or zero) for all y < (=)yL00, and it has been established above that dβ/dσ < 0.
Next, when πL < π01, we show that
dL¯(y)
dσ
=
∂L¯(y)
∂β| {z }
>(=)0
dβ
dσ|{z}
<0
< (=)0, (28)
if and only if y < (=)y¯∗01 exp(−1/β). This is because
∂L¯(y)
∂β
= −
µ
β ln
y
y¯∗01
+ 1
¶µ
y
y¯∗01
¶β I
β − 1
π01 − πL
πF
,
which is continuous in any positive y and admits a unique root y = y¯∗01 exp(−1/β) for all π01 > πL.
Then exp(−1/β) < 1 for all β > 1 implies that y¯∗01 exp(−1/β) < y¯∗01. Therefore ∂L¯(y¯∗01)/∂β =
−I
¡
π01 − πL
¢
/ (β − 1)πF < 0 implies that ∂L¯(y)/∂β > 0 if and only if y < y¯∗01 exp(−1/β). Then
recall from above that dβ/dσ < 0 to conclude. It remains to compare yL00 with y¯∗01 exp(−1/β). It is
easy to check that yL00 < (=)y¯∗01 exp(−1/β) if and only if β > (=) − 1/ ln
¡
πF /π01
¢
, or equivalently
πF < (=) exp(−1/β)π01. ¤
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Figure 1: Firm values under alternative strategies with P (X) = Yt (1−X), r = 1/2, α = 1/4, σ = 1/4,
and I = 1/10. If entry can occur at any point in time with no delay, and a firm can commit to lead, it enters
immediately before Yt reaches yL00, in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios alike. With no commitment,
each firm may lead with probability 1/2. In the Cournot scenario (point C), in equilibrium the leader enters
immediately before Yt reaches yp00, the follower enters at y
∗
01, firms’ value is L (y
p
00) = F
∗ (yp00). In the
Stackelberg scenario (point S), in equilibrium the leader enters immediately before Yt reaches y¯p00, the follower
enters at y¯∗01, firms’ value is L¯ (y¯
p
00) = F¯
∗ (y¯p00).
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Figure 2: When yf < y−f , and yp00 < y
−f , firm f leads by entering immediately before Yt reaches y−f . With
no first-mover advantage on the market stage, the two firms’ equal equilibrium value with perfect mobility (that
is F ∗(yp00) = L(y
p
00)) is lower than their respective values with limited mobility (i.e., F
∗(y−f ) and L(y−f ))
when yp00 < y
−f ≤ yˇ. In the latter case, f benefits more than −f from the delayed entry process (F ∗
?
y−f
?
<
L
?
y−f
?
). In the Stackelberg scenario, f is better-oﬀ than in the Cournot case (L¯
?
y−f
?
> L
?
y−f
?
), while the
follower is worse oﬀ (F¯ ∗
?
y−f
?
< F ∗
?
y−f
?
).
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